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Abstract
A nation of one billion people, India is often recognized as the world’s largest
democracy. The ethnic, cultural, and religious diversity in India creates a unique
collection of voters whose divisions are not only brought about due to differences in
ideological preferences, but also as a result of various caste and ethnic divisions that
remain strongly ingrained in modern Indian society. Indian political parties must not only
be able to gain voter confidence through the production and presentation of sound
ideology, but also must struggle to help relate this ideology to a much divided and
ethnically stratified voter base. This social construct has led to the rise of various political
parties in India whose political agenda is to cater specifically to unique ethnic groups and
minorities, while at times having to form political alliances gain power (Jana & Sarmah,
2002, 1). This study will analyze the rise of one such Indian political party formally
established as the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) in the state of Uttar Pradesh. More
specifically, it will address the following question: Has engaging in party coalitions
caused the BSP to sacrifice its ideology in the arena of Uttar Pradesh Politics?
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Introduction
Why Uttar Pradesh?
Uttar Pradesh is a state in the northern region of India bordering the state of Delhi
and the country of Nepal to its east. With a population of nearly 200 million people, Uttar
Pradesh is the most populace state in all of India and has struggled to prosper, with one of
the highest infant mortality rates in the country (Dhankani, 2010). Approximately onethird of its population lives below the poverty line and the state has the highest amount of
children who drop out of school to find labor (Dhankani, 2010). The BSP has grown
quite effectively over the years, but has experienced the most popularity and development
of political will in the state of Uttar Pradesh.
Perhaps one reason for the BSP’s ascendancy in Uttar Pradesh was due to the fact
that the Scheduled Caste population of Uttar Pradesh constitutes approximately 28.9
percent of the state’s population (National Commission for Scheduled Castes, 2013). This
is the largest Scheduled Caste (SC) population of any state, making it the perfect
breeding ground for a political party that caters specifically to this caste groups
economic, political, and social interests. Uttar Pradesh has historically had a large SC
population, but the SC and Other Backwards Castes (OBCs) were never able to unify in
neither a potent nor organized manner (Pai, 2004, 1589). The other main challenge was
supplanting the dominant party of the state, Congress. Table 1 below shows the
chronology of Chief Ministers in the state of Uttar Pradesh. In addition, it provides the
time periods during which the BSP was in power.
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Table 1.1 Chronology of chief ministers in the state of Uttar Pradesh
S No

Name

Took Office

Demit Office

Political Party

Govind Ballabh Pant
Govind Ballabh Pant
Sampurnanand
Sampurnanand
Chandra Bhanu Gupta
Chandra Bhanu Gupta
Sucheta Kriplani
Chandra Bhanu Gupta
Charan Singh
President`s Rule
Chandra Bhanu Gupta
Charan Singh
President`s Rule
Tribhuvana Narayana
Singh
Kamalapati Tripathi

26-Jan-50
20-May-52
28-Dec-54
10-Apr-57
7-Dec-60
14-Apr-62
2-Oct-63
14-Mar-67
3-Apr-67
17-Feb-68
26-Feb-69
18-Feb-70
2-Oct-70
18-Oct-70

20-May-52
27-Dec-54
9-Apr-57
6-Dec-60
14-Apr-62
1-Oct-63
13-Mar-67
2-Apr-67
25-Feb-68
26-Feb-69
17-Feb-70
1-Oct-70
18-Oct-70
3-Apr-71

Indian National Congress
Indian National Congress
Indian National Congress
Indian National Congress
Indian National Congress
Indian National Congress
Indian National Congress
Indian National Congress
Bharatiya Lok Dal

4-Apr-71

12-Jun-73

Indian National Congress

12-Jun-73
8-Nov-73

8-Nov-73
4-Apr-74

Indian National Congress

18
19
20
21

President`s Rule
Hemwati Nandan
Bahuguna
President`s Rule
President`s Rule
Narayan Dutt Tiwari
President`s Rule

5-Apr-74
30-Nov-75
21-Jan-76
30-Apr-77

29-Nov-75
21-Jan-76
30-Apr-77
23-Jun-77

22
23

Ram Naresh Yadav
Banarsi Das

23-Jun-77
28-Feb-79

27-Feb-79
17-Feb-80

Janata Party
Janata Party

24
25

President`s Rule
Vishwanath Pratap Singh

17-Feb-80
9-Jun-80

9-Jun-80
18-Jul-82

Indian National Congress

26
27
28
29
30
31

Sripati Mishra
Narayan Dutt Tiwari
President`s Rule
Vir Bahadur Singh
Narayan Dutt Tiwari
Mulayam Singh Yadav

19-Jul-82
3-Aug-84
11-Mar-85
24-Sep-85
25-Jun-88
5-Dec-89

2-Aug-84
10-Mar-85
24-Sep-85
24-Jun-88
5-Dec-89
24-Jun-91

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17

Indian National Congress
Bharatiya Lok Dal
Indian National Congress

Indian National Congress

Indian National Congress
Indian National Congress
Indian National Congress
Indian National Congress
Janata Dal
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32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46

Kalyan Singh
President`s Rule
Mulayam Singh
Mayawati
President`s Rule
Mayawati
Kalyan Singh
Jagdambika Pal
Kalyan Singh
Ram Prakash Gupta
Rajnath Singh
President`s Rule
Mayawati
Mulayam Singh Yadav
Mayawati

24-Jun-91
6-Dec-92
4-Dec-93
3-Jun-95
18-Oct-95
21-Mar-97
21-Sep-97
21-Feb-98
21-Feb-98
12-Nov-99
28-Oct-00
8-Mar-02
3-May-02
29-Aug-03
13-May-07

6-Dec-92
4-Dec-93
3-Jun-95
18-Oct-95
21-Mar-97
21-Sep-97
21-Feb-98
23-Feb-98
12-Nov-99
28-Oct-00
8-Mar-02
3-May-02
29-Aug-03
13-May-07
7-March 2012

Bharatiya Janata Party
Samajwadi Party
Bahujan Samaj Party
Bahujan Samaj Party
Bharatiya Janata Party
Indian National Congress
Bharatiya Janata Party
Bharatiya Janata Party
Bharatiya Janata Party
Bahujan Samaj Party
Samajwadi Party
Bahujan Samaj Party

(Zee Research Group, Zeenews.India.com)
Based on the history of elections in Uttar Pradesh, it can be seen that the Congress
party has taken 19 out of 37 contested elections, taking into consideration that there were
10 instances of President’s rule. It is clear that the apex of BSP political power has been
from 1995-2012.
This sudden rise of the BSP makes it a unique party to study. As will be
established in future chapters, Scheduled Castes in Uttar Pradesh vote almost exclusively
for the BSP. There has been a shift in confidence and high levels of lower caste political
mobilization that has allowed the BSP to gain power and sway in the state. The BSP’s
wide range of political coalitions have obviously helped the party gain influence and
control in various states, but in order to gain this newer, more powerful political status,
has it sacrificed the very principles that made it such a popular and earnest party for the
lower castes to follow?
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The Bahujan Samaj Party and its Unique History
Dalits or “ex-untouchables”, and backwards castes as a whole comprise a
stunning 52 percent of India’s population (Ghose, 2003, 83). From the years 1930 to
1950 a social activist named Dr. Bhimrao Ambedkar introduced a new form of leadership
involving grassroots level work, striving to address the concerns of lower caste
“untouchables” in India who had historically been oppressed both socially and
economically (Jaffrelot, 1998, 35). Dr. Ambedkar’s struggles and eventual passing led to
the rise of a new leader, Kanshi Ram, who aimed to unite lower castes through social
work and eventually began focusing the bulk of his organizational efforts in the building
of the political party that is known today as the BSP (Jaffrelot, 1998, 35).
Prior to formally being established as the BSP, the party went through a wide
range of changes. As of 1971, Kanshi Ram had established “The Scheduled Castes and
Scheduled Tribes, Other Backward Classes, and Minority Communities Employees
Association,” which served to unite various employees in districts who were considered
to be under the lower caste umbrella (Jaffrelot, 1998, 36). It can be seen that Kanshi
Ram’s initial work revolved heavily around the ideas of social transformation and
economic freedom for lower castes. However he quickly realized that these goals were
difficult to attain without major political backing and lower caste unification (Jaffrelot,
1998, 37).
The Bahujan Samaj Party was then officially formed on April 14th, 1984, allowing
for the official shift of organizational focus from social work to party politics. In the
legislative assembly elections of 1985 for the state of Uttar Pradesh the BSP contested the
9|Page

majority of the seats and won a meager 2.5 percent of the vote (Duncan, 1999, p. 40).
However, the party’s subsequent growth allowed it to obtain the title of National Party
from the Election Commission of India (Jaffrelot, 1998, 37). The next two decades saw
the BSP experience rapid growth and influence in the arena of party politics and the
implementation of policy aimed at aiding the Dalit and backward caste struggle, most
prominently in the state of Uttar Pradesh.

Political Coalitions
The BSP’s electoral success is seen as a unique phenomenon due to the fact that
no other Indian political party running primarily under the platform of catering to the
interests of ex-untouchables has achieved such success (Duncan, 1999, 36). However, the
BSP could not have achieved success by simple voter majority because Dalits and other
backwards castes (OBCs) do not comprise a direct voter majority. The BSP has found
success by forming political coalitions with the Samajvadi Party (SP), Congress,
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), all of which have very different political ideologies and
agendas than those of the BSP (Duncan, 1999, 44). The major question to address is
whether the formation of these political coalitions has led to the BSP having to sacrifice
its ideology for seats and political power at both the state and national level.
The BSP-SP government from 1993-1995 began to fade quickly after its inception
as the contradictions between the lower castes and middle classes began to come to
surface. As a result clashes between BSP and SP supporters began to increase at the
grassroots level (Jana & Sarmah, 2002, 245). The leader of the SP, Mulayam Singh
10 | P a g e

Yadav began a process referred to by the BSP as “Yadavization” in which Yadav pushed
for defecting against various members of the legislative assembly, leading to the creation
of anti-SP propaganda spread by the BSP (Jana & Sarmah, 2002, 246).
Soon after the failure of the BSP-SP coalition, the BSP entered into a political
alliance with the BJP, making rising political figure Mayawati the first female Dalit to
become the Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh. Mayawati’s tenure as Chief Minister of
Uttar Pradesh will be of significant focus throughout this study, as many changes were
effected during her administration that pose questions concerning political coalitions and
BSP ideology. While the political alliance between the BSP and BJP was surprising, it
displayed the political strategy of the BSP. The alliance would aid in exerting more
influence and power in the region, while the BJP allied to gain more Dalit support. This
was a trap specifically set by the BSP so that if the BJP were to back out of the alliance,
they would risk being labeled as biased against the lower castes (Jana & Sarmah, 2002,
247).
These various coalitions are important to analyze not only because they give
critical insight to the political and electoral strategies of the BSP, but more importantly
provide a framework of analysis to evaluate and investigate changes in BSP ideology
throughout each period of political alliance. Did the specific type of alliance lead to
different forms of ideological change? How did the era of the specific alliance affect the
implementation of BSP ideology through tangible, legislative action? Answering these
questions will help address how significant ideology is to the BSP relative to its need for
political coalitions.
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What is BSP Ideology?
In order to understand the potential changes in BSP ideology and the various
actions taken by the BSP in recent decades, information regarding the ideology must be
established. The political ideology of the BSP has a very strong egalitarian nature and
strives to create equal opportunity for the oppressed Dalit, Scheduled Caste (SC), and
other backwards caste (OBC) population. The ideology is deeply rooted in themes
concerning equality, economic and social independence, and bringing about change
within the “system.” The BSP’s voter base is cognizant of the party’s strong stance on
issues concerning social justice, which has made it one of the most popular parties for
underrepresented, oppressed, and lower caste communities.
Kanchan Chandra of New York University performed a statistical analysis which
aimed to determine whether a party had taken an official stance on an issue. This was
done by obtaining a sample consisting of “public statements by prominent party leaders,
including campaign speeches, radio broadcasts, slogans, press conferences, and
statements made during interviews” while excluding party literature not meant for a mass
audience (Chandra, 2004, 201). This is because the data was meant to be focused on
statements that voters have access to on a broad and common level. The data was chosen
from a random 9 of the 36 days of the official campaign period that lasted from April 7th
to May 12th, 1996.
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Table 1.2 Party issue positions, 1996
Issue

Congress

Bharatiya

National/Left Akali Dal

Janata

Front

BSP

Party
95.4

30.5

57.2

52.2

0

Price rise

.92

1.5

3.0

0

0

Nationalism

5.53

41.4

0

0

0

3.4

10.7

0

91.6

Good
governance

Social justice 2.3
Local issues

0

0

0

0

0

Other

1.38

5.4

8.4

30.4

4.2

(Chandra, 2004, 204).
The results of the study indicated in table 1.2 above, showed that the BSP
mentioned issues pertaining to social justice 91.6 percent of the time. Social justice and
the process of social transformation dominate BSP’s political discourse. The incredible
importance placed on this issue will play a key role when later analyzing whether the
BSP lives up to its hard stance on its ideology. The party has explicitly stated its ideology
on its official website, which is also addressed in the BSP constitution and has
enumerated various points that encompass its ideology for the public to access. Below are
some important excerpts of the party constitution that highlight the BSP’s political
mentality.
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“1. That all citizens of India being equal before law are entitled to be treated as
equal in true sense and in all matters and all walks of life, and where equality does not exist
it has to be fostered and where equality is denied it has to be upheld and fought for” (BSP,
4).
“The party shall work for these down trodden masses to- remove their
backwardness; to fight against their oppression and exploitation; to improve their status in
society and public life; to improve their living conditions in day to day life” (BSP, 5).
“The social structure of India is based on inequalities created by caste system and
the movement of the Party shall be geared towards changing the social system and rebuild it
on the basis of equality and human values” (BSP, 5).

These explicitly stated proclamations within the BSP constitution provide for an
excellent reference when analyzing BSP ideology through time periods and political
coalitions. Have these political coalitions and various power struggles within national and
state elections forced the BSP to contradict the very beliefs that they were founded upon?
The BSP’s rallying cry has famously been “85 percent living under the rule of 15 percent,
this will not last, this will not last” (Jaffrelot, 1998, 38). This theme has consistently been
that of the call for unification of those that experience social and economic injustice.
Figure 1 below, often reproduced in BSP speeches and publications, visually displays
where various caste groups fall into the “oppressed” region and into the “Bahujan Samaj”
(Chandra, 2004, 156).
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Figure 1.1 BSP claimed “social system” as a product of Brahminism (Chandra, 2004,
156).

Beneficiaries of the system
(10-15)%

Brahmins
Kshatriya
Vaishya

Victims of the System
(85-90%)

Intermediary Castes
Other Backward Castes (OBCs)
Scheduled Cases (SC)
Scheduled Tribes

Relevant Introductory Data
The BSP has been specifically chosen as the party of interest in this study because
of its rapid growth and rise into one of India’s top national parties. The BSP has broken
social and political barriers through its powerful political agenda and the shrewd politics
of its leader, Mayawati, whose victory was the first time a Dalit-led party won a state
election as a singlehanded majority (Sengupta, 2007, 6). This rise in standing can be seen
from the data provided in table 1.4 and figure 1.2.
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First, to put in perspective the type of demographic that the BSP has captured, the
table below describes the occupation and literacy rates among the Scheduled Castes
(SCs), who comprise the vast majority of BSP voters, versus the occupations and literacy
rates amongst non-Scheduled Castes (non-SCs). Table 1 makes it clear that the SC has a
considerably lower literacy rate compared to that of the non-SC. Additionally, most of
the SC work as agricultural laborers compared to cultivators, a key indicator of economic
inferiority.
Table 1.3 Comparative figures of scheduled caste (SC) and non-scheduled caste (nonSC) population in Uttar Pradesh
SC

Non-SC

46.7

68.5

41.3

14.8

Urban population

11.8

22.0

Literacy (all)

21.1

36.4

Literacy (urban men)

43.9

59.4

Literacy (urban women)

30.7

44.8

Literacy (rural men)

21.5

43.5

Literacy (rural women)

6.6

17.5

Working as cultivators in
rural areas
Working as agricultural
laborers in rural areas

(Duncan, 1999, 38)
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Both table 1.4 and figure 1.2 show the positive trajectory of the BSP in terms of
total votes and vote percentage in seats contested. This rapid upward trend occurred spans
close to over three decades and in a mere 7 elections. For a party that is comprised of exuntouchables and one that has been formed much later than most prominent national
parties in India to have accelerated at this rate, is quite remarkable. This data is
representative of electoral trends and associated statistics in the state of Uttar Pradesh, the
state in which the BSP has had the most electoral success (Sridharan, 2003, 149).
Table 1.4 Electoral performance of BSP in Uttar Pradesh state Assembly elections from
1989-2012
Year

Contested

Won

FD

Votes

% of

Vote % in

Total

Seats

Votes

Contested

1989

372

13

282

3,664,417

9.41

10.42

1991

386

12

299

3,532,683

9.44

10.26

1993

164

67

40

5,554,076

11.12

28.53

1996

296

67

28

10,890,716

19.64

27.73

2002

401

98

91

12,374,388

23.06

23.19

2007

403

206

36

15,872,561

30.43

30.43

2012

403

80

51

19,647,303

25.91

25.95

(Election Commission of India)
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Figure 1.2 Performance of BSP in Uttar Pradesh State Legislative Assembly Elections
from 1989-2012 (Election Commission of India).

35
30.43
28.53

Vote % in Seats Contested

30

27.73

25

25.95
23.19

20
15
10.42

10.26

10
5
0
1989

1991

1993

1996

2002

2007

2012

Election Year

Methodology
Throughout this study, various methods will be employed in order to reach a firm
and educated conclusion involving BSP ideological changes in accordance with the
various political coalitions that have been formed in the BSP’s active history. First, the
different periods of BSP prominence in Uttar Pradesh will be identified using data from
the Electoral Commission of India concerning election results. Analyzing election results
for the state of Uttar Pradesh will aid in laying the foundation for juxtaposing BSP
success in relation to ideology across various states and regions.
This is significant because it allows for more accurately investigating the BSP’s
numerous courses of action and how their political strategies concerning ideology may
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vary across different demographics in different states. It would be of importance to see
whether the BSP caters its ideological message in a unified manner or whether it must
defer due to political pressure when aligning itself with another party.
When the period of BSP control has been determined, thorough analysis will be
completed in evaluating the type of political coalition that the BSP had engaged in along
with which specific party it had joined forces with. The focus will be on the relationship
between the two parties throughout the tenure of the administration. The analysis will
address for example, questions concerning the party agenda and whether dissension led to
specific political action.
The next feature of the study is perhaps the most important. For each BSP
contested election in which a party coalition was formed, an examination of BSP policy
throughout the period will be completed. This will then later be contrasted with instances
of a BSP led government that has been formed without the potential advantage of a party
coalition. This will then be followed by an analysis of political action and ideological
stance during those administrations. Figure 1.3 visually displays the process that will be
applied to case study so that sound conclusions can be formed in regards to the effect of
coalitions on BSP ideology.
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Figure 1.3 Methodological process for BSP coalition case studies

Identification
of specific
BSP political
coalition

Brief
background
analysis of
the BSP's
partner in the
coalition

Examination
of political
relationship
throughout
coalition

BSP ideology
vs. political
action
throughout
course of
coalition

Case
conclusion

While ideological shifts within the BSP can be mapped by simply comparing
party action to the BSP constitution, juxtaposing BSP governments formed with the help
of party coalitions versus those formed without coalitions provides for a stable control
group. The study can then more accurately analyze to what extent party coalitions affect
BSP ideology, and if whether these coalitions affect ideology at all. This method of
analysis will help establish the last phase of the study in which patterns of ideological
action within BSP political coalitions will be contrasted with the 2007 BSP led
government in the state of Uttar Pradesh, which achieved victory without any coalition
partners (Sengupta, 2007, 6). The 2007 government led by chief minister Kumari
Mayawati will serve as the control group in the study.
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Literature Review
A myriad of resources will be used throughout this study in order to properly
analyze BSP ideology. A combination of scholarly articles, professional journal
publications, books, interviews, newspaper archives, and original BSP documents will aid
in answering the overarching research questions posed throughout the study. The
literature review will serve to help identify a collection of various sources in terms of
their importance to the development of the study.

Election Commission of India
The Election Commission of India is a permanent constitutional body that was
established in 1950 in order to give authority for the supervision, direction, and control of
the process for conducting elections in India. The website for the Election Commission of
India will provide the majority of the raw data regarding election results. The website
contains data regarding election results from the local to the national level. This data will
be of particular interest when juxtaposing the BSP’s relative popularity across various
states to its actual political success in those regions. This data will be investigated and
presented in both tables and graphs throughout the study in order to make the argument
that the BSP has risen and has a growing voter bank. In addition, data from the Election
Commission of India will help argue the significance of the BSP-SP and BSP-BJP
alliances.
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India’s Silent Revolution by Christophe Jaffrelot
This specific book is integral to this study in order to study the foundations of the
Dalit rise in India. Initially, the book breaks down the Congress party’s stronghold in
India and in various regions in which the lower castes primarily resided in. This
information will help set up the process of answering research questions concerning the
differences in political climate before and after the rise of the BSP. Jaffrelot extensively
discusses the various divisions between the scheduled castes and OBCs and delves deeply
into the importance of geography in the political shifts that occurred as a result. Most
importantly however, Jaffrelot includes a detailed chapter directly addressing the BSP.
The chapter is broken down into three major subsections.
The first discusses the evolution of the BSP from a mere interest group to a
political force. The second discusses the emergence of the BSP in different states
focusing on the years 1989-1999 and how Kanshi Ram, the face of the BSP in the early
phase of its rise, developed Dalit-dominant policy. The third and final section concerning
the BSP provides integral information pertaining to the specific political alliances that the
BSP engaged in, in order to merge the fragmented Dalit vote into one consistent voter
base. This section is significant because the information extracted from it will help make
the argument that the alliance that the BSP made with the Samajwadi and Bharatiya
Janata Parties was a result of a purely opportunistic party strategy.
Jaffrelot provides tables displaying statistics concerning atrocities committed
against Dalits and the percentages of Dalit government employees. This information will
be used to make arguments regarding what factors led to the unification of Dalits and
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why did this occur during that specific time period. Furthermore, Mayawati’s victory as
Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh is analyzed. The information presented on Mayawati will
be critical in analyzing whether or not BSP ideology was put into action and implemented
throughout her tenure as Chief Minister.

Why Ethnic Parties Succeed by Kanchan Chandra
Kanchan Chandra consistently frames her arguments in the context of theory
followed by data to back up claims. Chandra’s work focuses directly on the BSP and the
role of the various caste groups in making it an influential political party. Chandra breaks
down the motivations behind BSP support amongst the lower caste, why their preferences
have shifted, and why these preferences have translated into votes for the BSP. Chandra’s
analysis contains comparative studies between the caste representation of the BSP across
various time periods to numerically display the rising trend of Dalit and SC members
joining the party. Most importantly however, her analysis attempts to isolate the BSP
from the equation and attempt to decipher whether external events may have also played
a role in rising BSP support. This perspective will be of great interest when arguing that
participating in a coalition government helped the BSP lay its foundation as a political
power in Uttar Pradesh.

Dalits and Politics in Rural North India: The Bahujan Samaj Party in
Uttar Pradesh by Ian Duncan
Ian Duncan’s paper sponsored by the Journal of Peasant Studies is a significantly
valuable resource that will be consistently referred to throughout the study. Duncan
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initially presents the socio-economic conditions surrounding Dalits and lower caste
groups in the state of Uttar Pradesh. For example, data is given comparing literacy rates
of both SC urban men and women and compared to those of non-SC men and women.
Relevant statistics involving job occupations amongst the lower caste in Uttar Pradesh are
presented. This data will be applicable when analyzing the specific pockets of BSP
support and whether these statistics may change in the future if BSP ideology evolves and
helps argue that ideology did not evolve due to circumstances involving party coalitions.
When addressing whether BSP ideology has changed in the face of political coalition,
implemented legislation will be examined. Statistics such as the ones provided in
Duncan’s paper will give insight to the extent of such potential changes.

Religion, Caste and Politics in India by Christophe Jaffrelot
This book will be used for an analysis of Mayawati’s 2007 BSP government in
Uttar Pradesh. The text contains information essential to chapters 3 and 5 in this study,
specifically in the context of the political action taken by Mayawati to improve the
standing of the lower caste. Jaffrelot introduces information that will be directly relevant
to the argument made that Mayawati’s actions as chief minister leading up to and during
the 2007 administration was indeed different from her prior administrations in 1995,
1997, 2002, and 2007. This text will help cement the argument that BSP ideology did
indeed change over time.
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Chapter 2: The BSP-Samajwadi Party
(SP) Alliance
The Samajwadi Party (SP) has seen success in Uttar Pradesh as the party chiefly
representing the interests of OBCs. The party believes in creating a socialist society that
combines emphasizing egalitarian principles in conjunction with a secular and democratic
perspective (Samjwadi Party, 2012). The SP strongly believes in the “upliftment of
weaker sections of society” and standing against communal forces (Samajwadi Party,
2012). At first glance, the BSP and SP seem to have similar ideological interests as they
strive to work for the weak and oppressed minorities. However, over time the Samajwadi
party has attracted primarily OBCs while the BSP has developed a strong Dalit and
Scheduled Caste voter base (Verma, 2004, 1509). In order to more accurately understand
the complexity of the eventual relationship and political coalition between the BSP and
SP, it is important to consider the SP’s roots.

Brief History of the Samajwadi Party
The SP was founded by Mulayam Singh Yadav in October 1992 (Verma, 2004,
1509). Yadav was heavily influenced by the philosophy of Ram Manohar Lohia, an
Indian nationalist political leader. The party heavily stresses the development and
advancement of the common man, and has adopted the bicycle as its political symbol to
reflect that philosophy (Samajwadi Party, 2012). The SP has come to prominence
specifically in the state of Uttar Pradesh and formed the majority governments of 1993
and 2003 led my Mulayam Singh Yadav as the Chief Minister. Currently, the Chief
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Minister and the face of the SP in Uttar Pradesh is Akhilesh Yadav, son of Mulayam
Yadav (Samajwadi Party, 2012). Table 2.1 below shows a brief timeline of prominent
events leading up to the current political state of the SP, while table 2.2 shows the SP’s
success in the Lok Sabha and Uttar Pradesh Assembly elections from the years 19932002.
Table 2.1 Timeline of SP political milestones 1992-2003 ((Verma, 2004, 1510)
Year
1992

In September, Mulayam Yadav leaves
Samajwadi Janata Party (SJP) and forms
the SP

1993

Yadav elected leader of the SP legislature
party and becomes chief minister

1996

Yadav wins Mainpuri Lok Sabha sea and
becomes union defense minister

1998

Yadav elected as member of parliament
(MP) for 2nd time

1999

Yadav leads SP to victory in Lok Sabha
elections in Uttar Pradesh

2002

In Uttar Pradesh assembly elections, SP
wins an impressive 143 seats

2003

Yadav becomes chief minister for the third
time
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Table 2.2 Seat and vote share of SP in Lok Sabha and Assembly elections in UP 19932002
Year

Lok Sabha

UP Assembly

Seats

Vote %

Seats

Vote %

1993

-

-

109

17.82

1996

16

20.8

110

21.8

1998

20

28.7

-

-

1999

26

24.06

-

-

2002

-

-

143

25.41

(Verma, 2004, 1510)
The data in table 2.2 shows the overall positive trajectory in vote majority in both the Lok
Sabha and assembly elections that the SP experienced for nearly a decade. This rise to
prominence is important to recognize because it lays the framework for analyzing the
eventual BSP-SP coalition in 1993, with Mulayam Yadav as chief minister.

Why did the BSP and SP form a political coalition?
While there are a myriad of reasons that political parties engage in the process of
forming coalitions, the 1993 alliance between the BSP and SP was simply a matter of
increasing the political power of both parties. BSP leader Kanshi Ram was quoted as
saying “The reason why I concluded an alliance with Mulayam Singh Yadav is that if we
join our votes in Uttar Pradesh we will be able to form the government” (Jaffrelot, 1998,
p. 43). This type of political philosophy is directly related to Kanshi Ram’s assertion that
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Dalits should take each and every opportunity to exert influence and power in the arena
of party politics in order to be in a position to effect change. The 1993 assembly elections
saw the SP win 109 seats out of 425, while the BSP won 67 (Election Commission of
India; Verma, 2004, 1510). Additionally, the BSP attained 11 out of a total of 27
ministerial portfolios (Jaffrelot, 1998, 43).

BSP-SP Relations
The harmonious stages of the BSP-SP relationship did not last very long. As time
went on, both parties began to attempt to execute their own political party agendas at the
expense of cohesion and mutualism. The first such sign of discontent occurred primarily
due to the largely divided interests between the OBCs and SCs whose differing interests
are chiefly represented by the SP and BSP, respectively (Srinivasulu, 1994, 2585).
Dissension rose in regards to issues concerning land ownership, wages of agricultural
laborers.
Due to the BSP-SP victory, lower caste groups had become more assertive and
self-confident. This led to a dramatic rise in atrocities committed against Scheduled
Castes in the state of Uttar Pradesh, backlash inflicted by the higher castes as a result of
the potential for the rise and recent heavy politicization of Dalits, SCs, and OBCs
(Jaffrelot, 2003, 411). This staggering rise in reported atrocities from 4,200 in 1984 to
14,966 by 1995 further divided the two parties (Tatu, 1991, 31).
Leaders within the BSP felt that not enough was being done to protect Dalits and
atrocities continued to rise, culminating during a period of four months in 1994 when 21
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Dalit casualties occurred while attempting to install Ambedkar statues in various parts of
Uttar Pradesh (Jaffrelot, 2003, 412). SP leader and chief minister, Mulayam Singh
Yadav, also established many openly close relationships with BSP dissidents and
persuaded many to leave the BSP for the SP (Singh, 2002, 245). On June 2nd, 1995, the
BSP officially dissolved its political alliance with the SP (Jaffrelot, 2003, 412).

Ideology vs. Political Action
While BSP-SP relations began to fail shortly after the formation of the political
coalition, evidence suggests that the pressures and dissension had little effect on the BSP
going against its ideology. In fact, one of the main reasons for the conflict between the
two parties was the BSP’s insistence on standing behind its core values and principles,
and this was reflected through the actions the party took from 1993-1995.
One of the main pieces of evidence confirming the BSP’s efforts in implementing
its ideology was how its leaders confronted both the opposing Bharatiya Janata and
Congress parties, as the party tried to push for the implementation of the stipulations in
the Mandal Report. The Mandal Commission Report was a mandate that served to
identify the socially or educationally backward by adopting caste as the measure for
determining social and educational backwardness (Sakrikar, 1994). The commission
developed various social, educational, and economic criteria shown in table 2.3. The 11
indicators established by the commission were significant in that they provided the Indian
government with a more comprehensive and thorough definition of backwards castes in
India. The criteria established by the Mandal Report would then later be used to introduce
a system of reservation, in which those identified as members of a backwards caste,
29 | P a g e

would benefit from a 49.5% quota for governmental positions and educational
institutions.
Table 2.3 Standards established by Mandal Report for determining backwardness
Social

Educational

Economic

Castes considered as

Castes where the number of

Castes where average value

socially backward by others

children ages 5-15 who

of family asset is at least

never attended school is at

25% below state average

least 25% above the state
average.
Castes which mainly

Castes where student

Castes where number of

depend on manual labor for

dropout rate amongst ages

families living in kachcha

their livelihood

5-15 is at least 25% above

houses is at least 25%

the state average

above state average.

Castes in which the

Castes amongst whom the

Castes where the source of

percentage of married

proportion of matriculates is drinking water is beyond

women below 17 is 25%

at least 25% below state

half a kilometer for more

above state average

average

than 50% of households

Castes in which the

Castes where number of

participation of females in

households having taken a

work is at least 25% above
the state average

--

consumption loan is at least
25% above state average.

(Sakrikar, 1994)
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Despite the fact that Kanshi Ram publicly stated that there was no ideological
reason for a BSP-SP alliance, and how it was a mere vehicle to attain more influence in
Uttar Pradesh politics, both parties teamed together to vehemently oppose the Congress
and Bharatiya Janata Party’s attempts to block implementation efforts (Jaffrelot, 2011,
544). The BSP remained consistent with its ideological principles concerning social
transformation throughout the political process when they strongly supported the
implementation of reservations for the backwards castes. Moreover, a large reason that
the BSP-SP coalition fell out was due to the BSP feeling slighted by the SP, as the SP
attempted to take sole credit of many legislative actions completed by BSP leaders.
These measures established by both BSP and SP legislators included reservations
in schools, appointments of Urdu teachers which was highly popular with the minority
Muslim voters, and lastly giving jobs in the police force and public accounts committee
to those of backwards castes (Verma, 2004, 1512). While the SP cornered the BSP and
took the lion’s share of the credit, the BSP remained persistent throughout and effected
the type of tangible change reflective of social transformation that is so heavily
emphasized within its ideology and the party’s constitution.
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Chapter 3: The BSP- Bharatiya Janata
Party (BJP) Alliance
Directly after ending the political coalition between themselves and the SP, the
BSP forged a political alliance with the BJP. This was a monumental moment for the
BSP, as the newly formed BSP-BJP government elected Kumari Mayawati as chief
minister of Uttar Pradesh on June 3rd, 1995 (Jaffrelot, 1998, 46). The BSP-BJP alliance,
similar to that of the BSP-SP coalition, did not have anything to do with ideological
interests. Kanshi Ram publicly stated “we can take the help of the BJP to advance our
national agenda. We feel that the upper castes will be more amenable to social
transformation than the intermediate castes” (Jaffrelot, 1998, 47).
The BSP benefited from the coalition because they were able to effectively
establish themselves as the lead party in Uttar Pradesh, its home state. The BJP tactfully
joined the alliance in order to establish a strong split between the SP and BSP, who if had
stayed united, would have made the BJP largely irrelevant in Uttar Pradesh. This would
have had negative effects on BJP’s national agenda, and hampered its efforts to gain a
larger degree of central power (Brass, 1997, 2404).

Who are the BJP?
The BJP views Uttar Pradesh as an important state, a vehicle through which it can
exert its influence in Delhi. The party has been highly successful at the national level in
the past, has conservative Hindu roots, and favors economic liberalization. While the
BSP focuses almost entirely on social transformation, the BJP favors a wider, broader
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approach towards its issues. In Uttar Pradesh, the chief issues that BJP politicians attempt
to discuss when campaigning are good governance and creating policy deeply rooted in
nationalism (table 1.2). The BJP’s objective is to build India as a strong and powerful
nation and help facilitate a progressive, modern, and enlightened society drawing
inspiration from its cultural roots with an emphasis on a Gandhian approach to socioeconomic issues (Bharatiya Janata Party, 2012). Table 3.1 below displays the BJP’s
performance in the Uttar Pradesh’s assembly elections from 1989 to 2012, years that
coincided with a rise in BSP prominence.
Table 3.1 BJP performance in Uttar Pradesh assembly elections from 1989-2012.
Year

Contested

Won

FD

Votes

% of

Vote % in

Total

Seats

Votes

Contested

1989

275

57

153

4,522,867

11.61

18.11

1991

415

221

41

11770214

31.45

31.76

1993

422

177

20

16637720

33.3

33.3

1996

414

174

13

18028820

32.52

33.31

2002

320

88

50

10776078

20.08

25.31

2007

350

51

146

8851199

16.97

19.62

2012

398

47

229

11371080

15

15.21

(Election Commission of India)
The data presented in the table shows a clear decline in BJP success at the state
level in Uttar Pradesh. The data gives numerical insight as to perhaps why the BJP
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decided to engage in a political coalition with the BSP on multiple occasions. The
coalition resulted in a mutualistic relationship where both parties win, while each of their
individual agendas can be carried out.

Ideology vs. Political Action
Chapter 2 showed that the coalition between the BSP and SP did not affect the
BSP’s efforts in attempting to push for legislation that favored the lower caste despite
considerable opposition, a critical aspect of BSP ideology. When examining the BSP-BJP
coalition, the role of chief minister Kumari Mayawati cannot be ignored, as she
aggressively promoted the interests of the scheduled castes in Uttar Pradesh. Mayawati’s
tenure as chief minister during the 1993 BSP-BJP coalition played an integral role in
creating a consistent and loyal voter bank.
One of Mayawati’s first actions was to rename universities, local districts,
stadiums and other public spaces to reflect the history and culture of the scheduled caste
struggle (Jaffrelot, 1998, 47). In addition, Mayawati placed dozens of statues of Bhimrao
Ambedkar throughout the state, whose social work, philosophy, and grassroots work
were of great influence to the BSP (BSP, 2012). Mayawati placed these statues of
Ambedkar to symbolically impose a sense of BSP and scheduled caste power, while also
attempting to irk the upper class (Jaffrelot, 2011, 561).
During the first four and half months of her first tenure as chief minister of Uttar
Pradesh, Mayawati expanded various programs that appealed strongly to the scheduled
caste population. Perhaps the most important action taken by Mayawati was the changes
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her administration made to the existing Ambedkar Villages Scheme. The program
granted special funds for socioeconomic development for a period of one year to villages
who qualified if they had a scheduled caste population of at least 50 percent (Jaffrelot,
2011, 561). In June 1995, Mayawati changed the standards from at least 50 percent to a
mere 22-30 percent, which resulted in a total of 25,434 official Ambedkar villages
(Jaffrelot, 2011, 561). Due to this re-classification, many villages now had increases in
funding that eventually provided for new roads, water pumps, and houses.
The implementation of this policy was essential for establishing the important
consistent voter bank that the BSP enjoys today, and more importantly the scheduled
caste population was receptive and appreciative that a government was finally going to
large lengths to ensure that their condition was improved (Pai, 2002, 129). Table 3.2,
organized by type of minority group in Uttar Pradesh, shows the numerous new measures
granted under Mayawati’s BSP-BJP coalition government.
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Table 3.2 Minority-specific measures enacted by BSP-BJP coalition government under
Mayawati
Minority Group
Scheduled Castes

New Measures
-Renaming of major institutions and
regions to those related to the SCs
-Expansion of Ambedkar Villages Scheme
to increase accessibility to funding.
-Infrastructural improvements in villages
-Increase in education grants
-Social rehabilitation programs
-Implementation of quotas

OBCs

-Allocation of 27 percent of state budget to
improving the OBC condition.

Muslims

-Land reform
-Increase in student grants
-Reservations for low caste Muslims
-Allocation of 8.77 percent of state budget
for Muslim grievances

(Jaffrelot, 1998, 47-48)
The fact that this expansion of Ambedkar villages and finances was under the
direct supervision of Mayawati, indicates that the BSP did not have to sacrifice its agenda
and ideology due to the coalition. The BSP regards its ideology as “a movement for
ending exploitation of the weaker sections and suppression of the deprived through social
and economic change” (BSP, 3). An assertion can be made that the true motivation
behind the Ambedkar Villages Scheme was simply to consolidate the voter bank by
showing swift BSP action.
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While that surely may have played a part in loosening the standards set for
receiving the title of “Ambedkar village”, the effort on behalf of the BSP and the
programs’ resulting success cannot be disregarded. Within four and half months, the BSP
began to immediately show signs of high political efficacy. More importantly, the BSPBJP coalition had no effect on the BSP’s efforts to translate its verbal promises into
positive, tangible changes for its constituents, despite BJP opposition towards some of the
new policies.
The BSP-BJP government lasted only 136 days, as the BJP officially withdrew
support after just a little over four months as a result of both the rapid modifications to
pre-existing legislation and the implementation of new measures that were unpopular
with BJP officials (Duncan, 1999, 43). Instead of altering its strategy of social
transformation to accommodate the strategic opinions of the BJP, the BSP simply
regrouped and stood alone in the 1996 Lok Sabha elections and gained 20.6 percent of
the vote share, in hopes of further executing their policy agenda (Election Commission of
India). The BSP-BJP coalition did not result in a major change in BSP ideology.
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Chapter 4: The BSP, Change, and
Ideology- An AICC Perspective
For years, the All India Congress Committee (abbreviated AICC), commonly
referred to as Congress, was the preferred and dominant political party in Uttar Pradesh
(table 1.1). Congress is one of the most recognized and accomplished national parties in
Indian history, its roots as far back as Mahatma Gandhi’s civil disobedience movements
during the Indian struggle for Independence (AICC, 2008). The party was at the forefront
of major political negotiations with the United Kingdom leading up to eventual Indian
independence on August 15th, 1947 (AICC, 2008). Congress’s constitution states the
primary objective of the party is “the well-being and advancement of the people of India
and the establishment in India, by peaceful and constitutional means……in which there is
equality of opportunity and of political, economic and social rights….” (AICC, p. 1)1.
Previous chapters attempted to determine whether the BSP had shifted or
sacrificed its ideology as a result of the political alliances it formed using information
gathered and studied from scholarly articles, books, and statistical data. This chapter
however, will attempt to answer the same research question through an interview
conducted by myself with a prominent member of the Congress party.

1

There is a lack of information regarding the year the source was published. For purposes of clarification,
the parenthetical (AICC) refers to the All India Congress Committee’s constitution.
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Interviewee Profile
The individual interviewed has asked that he remain anonymous. This study will
refer to him simply as “A.K.” and he has been heavily involved in Congress for nearly
two decades. A.K. has contested multiple elections in his district in Uttar Pradesh against
candidates from parties including but not limited to, the SP, BJP, and BSP. He is highly
informed of the political history, demographics, culture, and political trends in the state of
Uttar Pradesh, as well as being heavily experienced in the nuances of election
campaigning in the state. A.K. was specifically selected for this interview due to the
difficulties his campaigns have experienced in winning elections due to the rising
influence of the BSP, and various other ethnic-based parties. His experiences as a
politician representing Congress in Uttar Pradesh can provide a unique perspective on the
BSP, its evolution, and its ideology. The interview follows a typical question and answer
format.

Interview of Congress party member “A.K.”
Q: Do you think that over the years, the power of Congress has diminished in Uttar
Pradesh?
A: Yes, it definitely has. We have seen the lower caste and Dalit vote bank move to
the BSP, and Congress has lost it. It was not always like this. Congress used to be an
important party for the Dalits in Uttar Pradesh for many years. It is becoming
difficult to gain that vote bank back for Congress.
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Q: As you are familiar, the BSP often engages in alliances with other parties that have no
ideological connection. Do you feel that this will be harmful to the BSP in the long run?
A: If you are referring to the alliances made with parties such as the BJP and
Samajwadi party, then I would say yes. Once, the Congress made a seating
arrangement with BSP. But, the ideology of BSP has been compromised by doing
these alliances. The BSP is not big enough to have a majority on its own. When the
BSP won in 2007 for the Assembly elections, they did so only because they realized
that they had to change. They had to change so that they can gain majority and this
was done when they moved away from the core vote bank to gain majority.
Q: The BSP strongly advocates social transformation as the main issue in its party
platform. How does congress respond to voters that claim that it does not cater as much
to the interests of lower castes, as the BSP does.
A: We have done a lot for lower castes. If you look at the history of Congress,
Congress was not just a party. We started as a movement; it was a party for all in
the beginning, starting with Gandhiji. It was a movement based on equality for all.
Q: Then what led to the eventual shift in voter preference?
A: This was because Congress was compromising its own ideology in UP. The
system that became from this favored the upper castes. As the time went on, upper
caste got the upper hand.
Q: Some literature that I have come across regarding BSP ideology has shown that
specifically, Mayawati has attempted to change the social structure of UP, for example
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her reservation policies. As an experienced member of Congress what are your thoughts
on this?
A: I think that she has gone against Kanshi Ram’s philosophy. Kanshi Ram’s was
very broad based in his policy. He wanted to get support of all different kinds of
lower castes. Mayawati’s policies in UP have caused divisions within the Scheduled
Castes. You are looking at the things she’s done like the quotas. See, but you have to
also look at how she is slowly shifting away from the original Kanshi Ram ideology.
She has started to favor Chammars much more recently and this has split the low
castes.
Q: Do you think that engaging in political coalitions affects the BSP’s ability to properly
implement its ideology? Do you believe the BSP feels pressure to implement its partner
party’s ideology instead, in terms of the BSP having to engage in “chamchagari”?
A: When they started yes, but not anymore. They are a very dominant
force…Important and very dominant in UP. Now the national parties are like a
chamcha to them, whether it be Congress or BJP.
Q: When I’m doing my research I read some statistics and they say that, Dalits who are
older in age, they continue to prefer Congress, whereas the younger generations tend to
prefer BSP. Do you think there is a reason for this?
A: In our agenda, we always talked about uplifiting of Dalits. But when the younger
generation grew up, they realized that it was a benefit to them much more to go with
the majority caste than just any lower caste. That’s how the original founder of the
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BSP, Kanshi Ram started this movement. It was called BS-4. See, he said that the
Dalits are not getting their due and stuff like that, he collected the whole Dalit
society and then picked up….in fact Mayawati has damaged the whole agenda of
Kanshi Ram. Because Kanshi Ram used to talk about Dalits in general, you know
not particularly picking up on any particular caste. But Mayawati is a Chammar,
and she just talks about Chammars. That’s why there is a division in the Dalits also.
Q: Do you think that the rise of ethnic parties in UP, such as BSP, is becoming a threat to
congress at the central stage?
A: See, UP is a very important state, and UP gives 80 MPs to the Lok Sabha. It’s a
very crucial and politically important state. And obviously the reason parties like
BSP or SP, which has damaged Congress only because they are eating our core vote
bank. Whether it is BSP or SP. SP has taken the Muslim vote bank. BSP has taken
away the Dalit vote bank. Congress is basically right now, a party without a core
vote bank. That’s the problem, Congress is damaged and affected. When we used to
be in government in UP, our majority used to be much more.

Examination of Interview Commentary
Congress party member A.K. places special emphasis on vote banks and how the
rise of ethnic and caste based parties has caused a traditional national party such as
Congress to be weakened and left without a core vote bank. A.K. also asserts that the
BSP has now become a more fragmented party in its Scheduled Caste base after enjoying
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higher levels of unity in its initial stages. He essentially argues that the 2007 BSP victory
in the state assembly, while monumental for BSP since it gained power without the need
for an alliance with another party, demonstrated a severe shift from original BSP
philosophy developed by Kanshi Ram.
While the methodology employed in investigating BSP ideology throughout the
study has been focused around BSP legislative action, A.K. brings up an intriguing point
in that the broadening of the BSP voter base should be considered as sacrificing ideology
for votes and power. Interestingly however, is the fact that such attempts to broaden
voter base have occurred in the absence of a BSP political alliance, and instead during
BSP attempts to branch out on its own to become a more independent party rather than
when in a coalition. The next chapter focuses entirely on the BSP’s 2007 UP state
Assembly victory, will take into consideration the assertions made by Congress member
A.K., and will also exploring the differences between BSP actions pertaining to ideology
when the party engages in political alliances versus when it does not.
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Chapter 5: The BSP as a SingleHanded Majority
May 11th, 2007 marked a monumental moment in the history of Indian politics, as
the BSP was voted to power as a single-handed majority in Uttar Pradesh’s state
assembly elections (Verma, 2007, 2039). Mayawati’s victory was the first time that a
Dalit-led party emerged victorious in state elections without participating in a coalition
government (Sengupta, 2007). Previous chapters in this study focused on the political
alliances that the BSP engaged in with the SP and BJP, and whether or not those alliances
affected BSP ideology. Chapters 2 and 3 established that neither the BSP-SP coalition nor
the BSP-BJP coalition affected the BSP’s ability or motivation to implement its ideology
in the form of legislation aimed at improving the Scheduled Caste condition.
This chapter will serve as a control in the study. The interview conducted in
chapter 4 with A.K., a prominent member of the Congress party, suggested that BSP
ideology has indeed changed in recent years. While analysis of coalitions with the SP and
BJP produced no significant evidence to suggest that the alliances affected BSP ideology,
would the case be different if the BSP was not participating in a coalition government?

BSP Strategy, Performance, and Political Action in the 2007 Uttar
Pradesh Assembly Election
In previous elections, the BSP consistently used caste as the focal point of its
campaign efforts, focusing solely on the interests of the lower castes and minorities such
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as SCs, OBCs, and Muslims. This was a successful strategy in the party’s early stages in
attempting to develop a consistent vote bank (A.K., 2013). Table 1.4 displays the BSP’s
consistent upward rise in terms of overall percentage of votes claimed in Uttar Pradesh
assembly elections, which coincided with the party’s early strategy of mobilizing lower
caste votes. Table 5.1 below shows the BSP’s electoral performance for the year 2007 in
the assembly elections. The BSP won a majority of 30 percent without the help of an
outside party or joining any official political alliance.
Table 5.1 BSP performance in 2007 Uttar Pradesh assembly elections
Contested

Won

Vote (%)

402

206

30.46

(Verma, 2007, 2039)
When campaigning for the 2007 election, the BSP shifted its electoral strategy.
While the BSP did advocate its usual caste dominated political aspirations, it instead used
the idea more of as a metaphor in order to create and cement grassroots alliances. These
grassroots efforts were built heavily on the premise of showing that the concerns of lower
castes were valued by the party just as much as the concerns of other communities (Gupta
and Kumar, 2007, 3388).
Mayawati began to reach out to the Brahmans in order to put forth an
understanding that the BSP was willing to listen to their concerns and grievances, while
being fully confident that the party would not lose the support of the lower caste by
engaging in political dialogue with upper castes (Gupta and Kumar, 2007, 3388). One
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major indicator of a shift in BSP policy was the fact that throughout the entire 2007
election campaign, Mayawati did not commit herself to Mandal policy. Mandal policy
refers to the various proposals concerning reservations and quotas that would improve the
conditions of the lower caste from an economic and social standpoint (see chapter 2
“Ideology vs. Political Action” for details of the Mandal Commission). This indicated
that the BSP was clearly sensitive to the perceptions of the upper castes in Uttar Pradesh
and began to think about the party’s potential to hold power in the long run. In fact, the
party decided against issuing a manifesto for the 2007 state elections in order to allow
Mayawati more flexibility in amassing a more diverse support network for the BSP
(Gupta and Kumar, 2007, 3390).
Another indicator of shifts in BSP ideology and strategy was the changing of BSP
slogans. In the early 1990’s the main slogan was as follows, and was directed at the upper
castes, who were painted as the enemies and the oppressors:
(1)“tilak, tarazu aur talwar, inko maro jutey char” (Gupta and Kumar, 2007, 3390)
The above slogan essentially berates the three symbols of Brahman and upper caste
superiority (tilak, tarazu, and talwar). Another famous BSP slogan that was used
consistently shortly after the party’s inception was the following:
(2) “85 percent living under the rule of 15 percent, this will not last, this will not
last” (Gupta and Kumar, 2007, 3390)
Now let us examine one of the main political slogans during the 2007 election campaign,
a more integrative slogan
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(3) “haathi nahin, Ganesh hai, Brahma, Vishnu, Mahadev hai” (Gupta and Kumar,
2007, 3390)
(4) “haathi badhta jayega, brahman shankh bajaega” (Gupta and Kumar, 2007,
3390)
These quotes instead paint a very different picture of the BSP’s view on the upper
caste. Quote 3 states that it is not about just the elephant (BSP symbol), but that one is
also a part of a broader Hindu spectrum. This slogan intends to push for more unity
between different castes. Slogan 4 essentially states that the elephant will continue to rise
and the Brahman will signal it. These slogans display how the BSP began to shift its
Scheduled Caste dominated agenda to increase the depth of their voter bank, something
that the party’s founder, Kanshi Ram, was against (Jaffrelot, 1998, 37).

Baichara Banao Samitis (Brotherhood Building Communities)
Mayawati continued to channel her new enthusiasm for creating a larger, more
diverse vote bank by creating the Baichaar Banao Samitis, which are essentially
committees to promote work between the higher and lower castes (Gupta, 2009, 21).
Each of the 403 assembly constituencies had one committee which contained 300
Brahmans and 100 Dalits, with a Brahman chairman and a Dalit general secretary (Gupta,
2009, 21). Mayawati’s plan began to work because as the upper castes began publicly
favoring the party, the lower castes began to rapidly throw even more support, thereby
increasing the vote bank and not limiting it to merely SCs, some OBCs, and a minority of
Muslims.
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While Mayawati’s newfound support for Brahmans was not with any particular or
official political party, it essentially served the same purpose. The BSP was able to attain
power by broadening its previously narrow base of supporters, and the Brahmans
benefited by attaining positions of power in her government. Despite gaining this
majority and winning office, enthusiasm waned for Mayawati’s newfound philosophy
because while the main bulk of her supporters were Dalits and lower castes, the promises
made by Mayawati concerning social transformation were truly made for the poor among
the upper castes (Gutpa, 2009, 22). Table 5.2 below numerically shows the rise in upper
caste support for the BSP. The BSP essentially shifted its philosophy from Bahujan to
Sarvajan, along with an ideological shift from exclusive to inclusive and reaped the
benefits at the expense of its ideology (Verma, 2007, 2042).
Table 5.2 BSP and caste-wise support in Uttar Pradesh assembly elections 1996-2007
Castes/

Percentage of Voters

Communities
Dalits

1996
62

2002
69

2007
77

OBCs

13

20

27

Muslims

12

10

17

Upper Castes

4

5

16

(Kumar, 2007, 2238)
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Conclusion
Kanshi Ram once aimed to transform the BSP into a major political force that
would cater directly to the interests of Dalits and other lower castes in India. Nearly three
decades later, it can be seen that the BSP has succeeded politically. With humble
beginnings, the BSP has now become a powerful political party with a strong and loyal
voter bank, most notably in the state of Uttar Pradesh. The whole purpose of creating the
BSP was to politically mobilize the weak, exploited, and oppressed lower castes in India,
and to work to improve their situation and standing in a social, political, and economical
context.
In order to consolidate this consistent and loyal voter pool, the BSP adhered very
strictly to its ideology in its early stages. Aware that their party was too weak to attain
majority by itself, the BSP engaged in political coalitions with the Samajwadi Party and
Bharatiya Janata Party, both parties that differed from the BSP ideologically. This study
posed the question of whether engaging in these political coalitions, caused the BSP to
shift its ideology. The analysis shows that yes, engaging in political coalitions did indeed
cause the party to shift its ideology over a long period of time, but not directly because of
coalitions.
First, there was the BSP-SP alliance. While the two had nothing in common
ideologically, both parties understood that an alliance would put them in a powerful
position in the state politics of Uttar Pradesh. The alliance still saw the BSP put into
motion numerous provisions and acts to help improve the condition of lower castes in the
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state. Second, there was the BSP-BJP alliance. This coalition government did not hinder
the BSP, as it rejected opposition from BJP members and went through with a series of
economic and social provisions. These provisions included quotas, reservations, and
increased funding for Ambedkar villages throughout Uttar Pradesh.
Lastly, the singular BSP state government of Uttar Pradesh in 2007 was studied,
and this is when the most notable changes to BSP ideology occurred. The BSP changed
party slogans, policies on reservations, and introduced a variety of measures to appeal to
the upper caste in an attempt to broaden its one-dimensional voter bank that at the time
was comprised mainly of Scheduled Castes, OBCs, and a minority of Muslims in the
state.
The analysis establishes that the BSP initially stayed very firm to its ideology
even when engaging in political coalitions, in order to create a dependable and stable
voter bank. Once the BSP confirmed that it had established enough political popularity
and authority in the state of Uttar Pradesh, it began to shift ideology towards a more longterm and all-encompassing approach. It was not the BSP’s participation in coalition
governments that directly resulted in changes in ideology, but rather using those
coalitions as ladders to build power, influence, and party identity. Once the BSP’s
political power in Uttar Pradesh was confirmed through its early success, the party then
had the luxury to shift its ideology starting in the 2007 state assembly elections of Uttar
Pradesh, and begin to shift its agenda towards broader electoral support. All of these
ideological changes occurred due to an underlying ambition within members of the party,
to one day establish the BSP as the majority party at the national level.
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